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The Real Estate Lender's Updated Guide to Single
Asset Bankruptcy Reorganizations
Alfred G. Adams, Jr. and Jason C. Kirkham*
I. INTRODUCTION
After eighteen years of nearly uninterrupted growth in commercial
real estate markets, defaults by commercial real estate borrowers are
rising dramatically. In some cases, loans have defaulted because (due
to the general downturn in the economy) the property is no longer
generating income sufficient to pay the property's debt service and
operating costs. In other cases, the property may currently be able to
cover expenses, but the loan has matured with no new financing on
the horizon. Regardless of the cause, lenders face a scenario that is
becoming all too familiar: The borrower is a special purpose entity
that owns a single real estate project. The project was financed by a
mortgage loan, which may be either recourse or non-recourse to the
borrower and which may (or, may not) be guaranteed (in whole or in
part) by the borrower's principals. With no cure, refinancing or
workout in sight, the lender has accelerated its loan and begun the
process of foreclosing on the project. But, the borrower, who remains
convinced that an economic recovery is just around the corner, insists
that if the lender will just renegotiate the loan terms, the project can
survive the current crisis, enabling the (eventual) repayment of the
debt and the salvaging of the borrower's equity in the project. To in-
crease the lender's willingness to agree to terms, the borrower has
filed a Chapter 111 bankruptcy petition, threatening a "cramdown"
unless the lender agrees (among other concessions) to reinstate the
loan and extend its maturity.
What are a lender's options when a single asset borrower files a
Chapter 11 petition? Outside of Chapter 11, the rules are fairly sim-
ple: either the mortgage lender gets its loan repaid or it gets its collat-
* The authors practice with the firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, in the firm's At-
lanta, Georgia office. Mr. Adams is also an adjunct professor of law at Duke University School
of Law. This article is an updated and revised version of a 1993 article written by Mr. Adams,
which appeared in 98 Com. L.J. 350 (1993). They gratefully acknowledge the valuable contribu-
tions to this article made by their colleagues, Thomas M. Byrne and Justin Lischak Earley.
1. See 11 U.S.C. H§ 1101-74 (2006). Chapter 11 is the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code dealing
with business reorganizations.
1
2 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
eral. In Chapter 11, the rules are quite different. The mere filing of a
Chapter 11 petition initiates an automatic stay enjoining virtually all
acts against the debtor or its property, including foreclosure. 2 Unlike
a Chapter 7 liquidation, where a trustee is appointed immediately
upon filing, the borrower in a Chapter 11 reorganization remains in
control of its assets as a "debtor-in-possession." Virtually all business
entities, including corporations, limited liability companies, partner-
ships, and sole proprietorships, may seek Chapter 11 relief.3 Insol-
vency is not a requirement.4
Over twenty-five years ago, in the midst of another severe reces-
sion, a bankruptcy court aptly observed that in Chapter 11 "there are
seldom any winners, just survivors." 5 This Article summarizes the key
issues that arise in single asset Chapter 11 cases and discusses strate-
gies and tactics mortgage lenders can employ to maximize their
chances of survival. In particular, this Article examines two signifi-
cant changes in the world of commercial real estate finance since the
last real estate recession: (1) the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse and
Consumer Protection Act of 20056 ("BAPCPA") on bankruptcies by
single asset real estate entities and (2) the increasingly widespread use
of so-called "springing," "exploding," and "non-recourse carve-out"
guaranties in commercial real estate loans. As discussed below, while
these two developments may discourage bankruptcies by single asset
entities and limit single asset debtors' options once a bankruptcy peti-
tion has been filed, lenders are likely to face new challenges by debt-
ors who are able to seek bankruptcy protection.
2. Id. §§ 301, 362(a) (2006). The automatic stay applies to all efforts by any creditor to collect
the debt it is owed. Attempting to obtain the appointment of a receiver or attempting to use
"self-help" measures to collect rents generated by a project are clearly stayed. Once the bank-
ruptcy case is filed, no further steps can be taken regardless of whether the creditor has knowl-
edge of the bankruptcy filing. Sanctions can result from "willful" violations of the automatic
stay. See Id. § 362(k); In re Atl. Med. Mgt. Servs. Inc., 387 B.R. 654, 661-67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2008).
3. However, banks, insurance companies, thrifts, credit unions and stockbrokers are ineligible
for Chapter 11 relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), (d) (2006).
4. E.g., In re Capitol Food Corp., 490 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). There is no statutory require-
ment that a debtor demonstrate insolvency to be eligible to file a voluntary case. The debtor
does not have to show either balance sheet insolvency or that debts cannot be paid as they come
due. See id. In an involuntary case, however, the petitioning creditors must be able to demon-
strate that the debtor is not paying its debts as they come due if the debtor contests the involun-
tary petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (2006).
5. In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
6. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE RECESSION OF THE EARLY 1990s
A. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005
The BAPCPA, while best known for its provisions making it more
difficult for consumer debtors to discharge their debts under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code, also removed the $4 million cap that for-
merly applied to the Bankruptcy Code's special provisions for single
asset real estate entities. With the elimination of the cap and other
changes, the requirements applicable to single asset real estate debt-
ors - which initially were made part of the Bankruptcy Code by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19947 - have enhanced value to real estate
lenders.
1. Relief from the Automatic Stay for Secured Creditors of
Single Asset Real Estate Entities
As mentioned above and discussed in more detail below, a principal
reason for debtors to seek bankruptcy protection is the automatic
stay, which halts all collection efforts against the debtor (including
foreclosure of a lender's mortgage). In recognition of the abuse of
bankruptcy by real estate borrowers during the recession of the early
1990s, Congress enacted Section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which requires the court to grant relief from the automatic stay to a
secured creditor of a single asset real estate entity unless, within 90
days8 after the order for relief 9 or 30 days after the court determines
that the debtor is a single asset real estate entity, whichever is later,
"(A) the debtor has filed a plan that has a reasonable possibility of
being confirmed within a reasonable time; or (B) the debtor has com-
menced monthly payments that . .. are in an amount equal to interest
at the then applicable nondefault contract rate of interest on the value
of the creditor's interest in the real estate."10
Until the passage of the BAPCPA, a secured creditor could only
seek relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) if the
total debt secured by the property did not exceed $4 million, making
the provision of little practical use. In addition to removing the $4
7. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
8. The court may extend the 90 day period for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
9. In a voluntary case, the filing of the Chapter 11 petition constitutes an order for relief. Id.
§ 301(b).
10. Id. § 362(d)(3).
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million ceiling, the BAPCPA provides that interest payments must be
at the nondefault contract rate of interest."
Because a debtor has until the later of 90 days after the petition
date or 30 days after the date that the bankruptcy court determines
that the debtor is a single asset real estate entity, a lender should con-
sider seeking an early determination on that issue. If a lender waits
until the 90 day period has expired before seeking the determination,
the lender may unintentionally afford the debtor an additional 30 days
or more, depending on how soon a court will rule on the lender's mo-
tion, before the debtor will be required to file a plan or start paying
debt service. 12
Although courts have described the legislative history of Section
362(d)(3) as "meager,"13 they have recognized that it was designed to
correct the "relative unfairness of lengthy delay" in single asset cases
and that "where the case does not early kick forward toward confir-
mation, a debtor must compensate its mortgagee for the time-value of
the mortgagee's debt-investment, by the payment of interest at the
original contractual rate." 14  Unfortunately, however, some courts
have denied secured creditors' requests under Section 362(d)(3) even
though the debtor failed to comply with the plain requirements of the
statute.15
2. Elements for Relief under Section 362(d)(3)
Real estate lenders seeking relief from the automatic stay under
Section 362(d)(3) will face a number of issues:
a. Is the Debtor a Single Asset Real Estate Debtor?
The Bankruptcy Code defines "single asset real estate" as:
11. See id. Before the BAPCPA's passage, the interest only had to be at the "current fair
market rate," thereby allowing courts to approve lower interest rates. See, e.g., In re Cambridge
Woodbridge Apts., LLC, 292 B.R. 832, 840 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that debtor's ade-
quate protection payments of $19,250 were "in an amount equal to interest at a current fair
market rate" even though this amount was less than the debt service required under the
mortgage).
12. See, e.g., In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399, 407 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (granting debtors
30 days to file a plan of reorganization or commence making interest payments to their mortgage
lenders, since "the initial ninety (90) day period has long since expired").
13. In re Archway Apts., Ltd., 206 B.R. 463, 465 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997).
14. In re Heather Apts. Ltd. P'ship, 366 B.R. 45, 49-50 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007).
15. See In re Windwood Heights, Inc., 385 B.R. 832, 841 (Bankr N.D. W. Va. 2008) (even
though debtor's plan was "patently unconfirmable," the court nonetheless gave the debtor 30
additional days to file a modified plan because of the secured creditor's "substantial equity cush-
ion," notwithstanding the statutory deadlines).
[Vol. 8:1
SINGLE ASSET BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS
[R]eal property constituting a single property or project, other than
residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which
generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not
a family farmer and on which no substantial business is being con-
ducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real
property and activities incidental.16
Although there have been some cases discussing under what circum-
stances multiple properties constitute a "single project,"1 7 most cases
have turned on whether the debtor conducts substantial business on
the property other than the business of operating the real property
and incidental activities, especially when the property in question is
operated as a hotel.' 8
b. Has the Debtor Submitted a Plan with "Reasonable Possibility
of Being Confirmed Within a Reasonable Time?"
If the debtor qualifies as a single asset real estate entity, a debtor
can still avoid foreclosure if, within 90 days of the date of its bank-
ruptcy petition or 30 days after the bankruptcy court determines the
debtor to be a single asset real estate entity, the debtor files a reorgan-
ization plan that has a "reasonable possibility of being confirmed
within a reasonable time."19 In addressing whether a plan filed by a
debtor meets that threshold, courts have looked to the case law that
has developed since the Supreme Court's decision in United Say.
Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of In wood Forest Associates., Ltd,20 in which
the Court announced a very similar standard for deciding whether to
grant motions for relief from the stay under Section 362(d)(2), which
allows for relief if the debtor does not have equity in the property and
the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 21
16. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2006).
17. E.g., In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220, 223-25 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
18. In deciding whether the debtor engaged in substantial business other than the business of
operating the real property, courts look to whether the debtor has significant revenue other than
"the passive collection of rent from tenants." In re Scotia Pac. Co. LLC, 508 F.3d 214, 221 (5th
Cir. 2007) (citing In re Club Golf Partners, L.P., no. 07-40096-BTR-11, 2007 WL 1176010, at *6
(E.D. Tex. April 20, 2007) (holding that actively managed timberlands do not qualify as single
asset real estate); see also In re CBJ Dev., Inc., 202 B.R. 467, 472-73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996)
(where debtor's botel included gift shop, restaurant, and bar, there was "substantial other busi-
ness"); In re Whispering Pines Estate, Inc., 341 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006) (where hotel
maintained swimming pool, provided phone and internet service, and served continental break-
fast, it was not a single asset real estate debtor, even though it did not operate any bar, restau-
rant, or gift shop).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
20. 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
21. See, e.g., In re Windwood Heights, Inc., 385 B.R. 832, 837-38 (N.D. W. Va. 2008); In re
Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1090. at *39-*41 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2005); In re Harwood Hideout, Inc., No. 04-31494, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 670, at
2009] 5
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c. Has the Debtor Commenced Payments on the Lender's
Interest in the Real Estate?
If the debtor has not filed a plan as required under Section
362(d)(3), it can still avoid relief from the automatic stay by com-
mencing to pay interest to the lender. While the interest must be at
the non-default contract rate, the interest need only be paid on the
value of the lender's interest in the collateral, not the full amount of
the debt. Thus, if the lender is undersecured, it will be entitled to less
than the interest provided for under the loan. Furthermore, the
debtor can (notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Code's restrictions on
the use of cash collateral22) pay the interest from pre- and post-peti-
tion rents without court or lender consent.23
B. Springing, Exploding, and Non-recourse Carve-out Guaranties
Following the recession of the early 1990s, lenders increasingly in-
sisted that loans be structured with the borrower as a single purpose,
"bankruptcy remote" entity ("SPEs"), which would own no assets
other than the mortgaged property and which would therefore be in-
sulated from economic problems unrelated to that property. Use of
SPEs was also driven by the market in commercial mortgage backed
securities, as the rating agencies required their use.
Because, by definition, the SPE would have no assets other than the
real property (and personal property used in connection with its oper-
ation), lenders typically have insisted that a creditworthy person or
entity enter into a "non-recourse carve-out guaranty." That guaranty,
which is sometimes referred to as an "exploding" or "springing" guar-
anty, would make the guarantor liable for certain "bad acts" - most
typically intentional acts that would diminish the value of the collat-
eral (e.g., fraud, waste, or misappropriation of insurance proceeds and
rents).2 4 In addition, and most important for the lender facing a po-
tential borrower bankruptcy, the guaranty would typically make the
*2-*3 (Bankr. D.N.D. Mar. 4, 2005); In re 68 West 127 Street, LLC, 285 B.R. 838, 846-48
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). See infra Part IV.B.4.b.ii for a discussion of obtaining relief from the
stay pursuant to Section 362(d)(2).
22. See infra Part IV.B.3; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2006).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B) (2006).
24. Depending on the negotiations between the lender and borrower, the guarantor might be
liable for only actual losses suffered by the lender because of the borrower's bad acts, or the loan
might become fully recourse to the guarantor. Full recourse provisions are a potential minefield
for borrowers. See, e.g., Blue Hills Office Park LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d
366, 388-92 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding guarantor liable for the full amount of a $17.5 million loan
where borrower had diverted a $2 million condemnation settlement to itself).
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guarantor liable for the full amount of the loan if the borrower filed a
voluntary bankruptcy petition.25
The threat of full personal liability may deter some borrowers from
using bankruptcy to obstruct a lender's efforts to foreclose on the col-
lateral. Guarantors will certainly, however, challenge enforceability
of these guaranties on a number of grounds, both directly (when
lender's attempt to enforce the guaranties) and indirectly (by asking
bankruptcy courts to enjoin enforcement of the guaranties). Guaran-
tors are likely to argue that by encouraging the guarantor to put its
personal interest ahead of the rest of its partners, these guaranties fos-
ter breaches of fiduciary duty and therefore are void as a matter of
public policy. In addition, guarantors are likely to ask bankruptcy
courts to use their equitable powers to enjoin collection efforts against
guarantors. 26 So far, only two reported cases deal with the enforce-
ment of non-recourse carve-out obligations, and both have upheld the
lender's position.27 Given the ubiquity of these guaranties in the last
real estate cycle, more cases are certain to arise.
III. THE DEBTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
A. Breathing Spell
The filing of the Chapter 11 petition halts the foreclosure process
and gives the debtor a "breathing spell" within which to attempt to
restructure its debts. In a single asset case, for at least 90 days, the
debtor is relieved of the responsibility to pay debt service, although a
mortgage lender may be entitled to demand "adequate protection"
(which may include the payment of debt service) with respect to its
collateral, either because it is undersecured or as a condition to al-
25. Typically, but not always, the guarantor will directly or indirectly control the borrower. In
mezzanine debt structures, however, it is possible that the mezzanine lender could foreclose on
its interest in the borrower entity. Once in control of the borrower, the mezzanine lender could
then threaten to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, making the loan fully recourse to the guar-
antor, even though the guarantor no longer controls the borrower. It goes without saying that
borrowers and their counsel need to consider seriously this possibility when negotiating any sort
of guaranty triggered by a borrower bankruptcy.
26. See infra Part III.F.1.a.
27. See FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding liability of
borrower's general partner in an action, brought after dismissal of borrower's bankruptcy peti-
tion, where loan agreement provided that loan would be non-recourse to borrower, except for
certain acts, including borrower's bankruptcy); First Nationwide Bank v. Brookhaven Realty
Assocs., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that lender could bring deficiency
judgment against borrower's principals where loan agreement provided that it was non-recourse
unless the borrower commenced a bankruptcy proceeding that was not dismissed within ninety
days of filing).
2009] 7
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lowing the debtor to use cash collateral.28 To reorganize successfully,
the debtor must propose and confirm a plan of reorganization. But
unless and until the mortgage lender is able to obtain either relief
from the automatic stay (either because of the single asset provisions
or otherwise) or a dismissal of the case, the lender cannot take any
action to obtain payment or recover its collateral from the debtor.
The stay enjoins commencing or continuing a lawsuit against the
debtor, attempting to foreclose on any asset of the debtor, creating or
perfecting any lien against the debtor's property, and even sending
dunning or default notices. Acts taken in violation of the stay are void
or voidable and may expose the mortgage lender to monetary
sanctions.29
B. Adjustment of Debts
Chapter 11 provides the owner of a real estate project the opportu-
nity to restructure its mortgage and other debts and to retain owner-
ship of the project by confirming a plan of reorganization. The plan
does not have to be consensual. Even without uniform creditor con-
sent, a debtor may "cramdown" a plan over the objections of some
creditors, so long as at least one class of impaired creditors votes for it
and the plan complies with certain fundamental requirements, al-
though the courts currently do not agree on the interpretation and
application of many of these requirements. 30
C. Rejection or Assumption of Contracts and Leases
The debtor can choose to assume or reject executory contracts and
leases. 31 Court approval must be obtained, but courts generally leave
the decision to reject a contract or lease to the debtor's business
judgment.32
28. See infra Part IV.B.4.b.i.
29. See supra note 2.
30. See infra Part VI.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). Section 365 does not define "executory contract." The widely
accepted definition is that an executory contract is a contract in which material performance
remains due from both sides to the contract as of the date of the bankruptcy filing, such that one
party's failure to perform would give the counterparty a claim for material breach of contract.
See In re Herbert, 806 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). Unexpired real property leases are clearly
covered by Section 365, and the Section 365 requirements of curing (or in some cases, compen-
sating for) all existing defaults and providing adequate assurance of future performance must be
met prior to assumption of any such leases. In a single asset case, this is generally not a difficult
requirement because the debtor, as the owner of the real estate, is typically not in default under
the unexpired lease.
32. The "business judgment test" was first articulated by the Supreme Court in a case decided
under the former Bankruptcy Act. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.
[Vol. 8:1
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1. Effect of Rejection
Rejecting an executory contract deprives the other party to the con-
tract of the remedy of specific performance and leaves it with a claim
against the debtor's estate.33 Lessees of real property are accorded
special protections from the consequences of rejection by their les-
sors. 3 4 Nonresidential leases are deemed to be rejected if not assumed
or expressly rejected within 120 days of the order for relief, or before
the confirmation of the reorganization plan, whichever is earlier.35
2. Assumption
If the debtor instead assumes an executory contract or lease, it must
cure all defaults (to the extent possible), compensate the other party
for damages, and assure adequate future performance. 36 An assumed
contract may be assigned, notwithstanding contractual restrictions on
assignment, if the proposed assignee can provide assurance of future
performance.37 Special provisions limit the ability of a tenant-debtor
to assume and assign shopping center leases.38
Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943). Courts have given debtors broad latitude to reject leases and
contracts under the business judgment test. As long as a debtor can offer any plausible business
reason why the lease or contract should be rejected, the courts will allow the debtor to reject the
lease or contract. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984); Lubrizol
Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th Cir. 1985); see also
In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36. 44 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Congress left intact Bildisco's discus-
sion of garden variety executory contracts during Chapter 11 proceedings.").
33. If a lease is rejected, the Bankruptcy Code specifically limits the damages a lessor can
claim against the lessee's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (2006). Section 502(g) treats a rejection as a
breach occurring immediately prior to the filing, thereby entitling the lessor to an unsecured
damages claim. The amount of the lessor's unsecured claim is limited to the greater of one
year's rent or 15 percent of the remaining term (not to exceed three years) of the lease. Id.
§ 502(b)(6)(A).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006). Section 365(h) specifically allows a lessee to remain in posses-
sion of the leasehold pursuant to the terms of the lease. This provision allows the lessee to
continue paying the rent at the rate specified in the lease for the remaining term of the lease. Id.
Section 365(h) prevents a single asset debtor from rejecting below-market leases in an effort to
replace those leases with tenants paying higher rents.
35. Id. § 365(d)(4). The bankruptcy court may extend the 120 days to 210 days, but no further
absent the lessor's consent.
36. Id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
37. Adequate assurance of future performance is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code and
must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The level of adequate assurance that the assignee must
provide will vary in direct relation to the financial strength of the assignee. See id. § 365(f).
38. Id. § 365(b)(3). Section 365(b)(3) is designed, in part, to protect the mix of tenants in a
shopping center. If a tenant in a shopping center files bankruptcy and seeks to assume and then
assign the lease to a new tenant, the new tenant must not affect the existing tenant mix or
balance.
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3. Lending Agreements are Non-Assumable
Certain types of executory contracts may not be assumed, e.g., per-
sonal service contracts and contracts to make a loan or extend finan-
cial accommodations. Consequently, a loan commitment cannot be
assumed by a Chapter 11 debtor, nor can the bankruptcy court compel
a lender to make additional advances to a debtor pursuant to a line of
credit or other loan agreement. 39
4. State Law Damages Limited
The Bankruptcy Code limits certain kinds of damages that could
otherwise be claimed against the debtor under state law. These lim-
ited damages include a lessor's claim for future damages for breach of
a lease, an employee's damages for breach of an employment con-
tract, and claims for unmatured, interest on unsecured and under-
secured obligations. 40
D. Sales and Financings Facilitated
The sale of a real estate project may be "cleaner" from the buyer's
standpoint if accomplished in Chapter 11 with court approval. A po-
tential buyer may be unwilling to buy a project from a financially
troubled debtor outside of bankruptcy because of fears of potential
claims, including the possibility that the sale may be set aside as a
fraudulent or preferential transfer in the event of an ensuing bank-
ruptcy. In Chapter 11, however, a real estate project can be sold free
and clear of liens, with the liens attaching to the sale proceeds. 41 If
39. Id. § 365(c)(2). The language of Section 365(c)(2) prohibits a debtor from forcing a lender
to provide any financial accommodation to a debtor. Since the term "financial accommodation"
is not defined, while a single asset debtor clearly could not force a lender to advance additional
funds pursuant to an existing loan agreement, it is not clear whether certain services by a mort-
gage lender (e.g., releasing funds previously escrowed to pay a contractor) are "financial accom-
modations" governed by Section 365(c)(2). Logic suggests that they should not be. See, e.g., In
re Neuhoff Farms, Inc., 258 B.R. 343, 348 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000) (noting that section 365(c)(2)
must be narrowly construed).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). In bankruptcy, an unsecured creditor is not entitled to any post-peti-
tion interest. Id. § 502(b)(2). Further, an undersecured secured creditor (i.e., a creditor whose
collateral is worth less than its debt) is not entitled to post-petition interest on its claim. United
Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Fire Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). "Free and clear" sales under Section 363(f) have gained considerable
attention, particularly in light of their use in the recent General Motors and Chrysler bankrupt-
cies. See In re General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026, 2009 Bankr. Lexis 1687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 2009) (approving, over objection of unsecured creditors, sale of substantially all of Gen-
eral Motors' assets to a government-funded purchaser); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving sale of substantially all of Chrysler's assets to a government-funded
purchaser).; cf. Fla. Dep't. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 n.2
(noting the use of sales under Section 363(b) prior to the confirmation of a plan). To gain ap-
[Vol. 8:1
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the sale is effected pursuant to a confirmed plan, impediments that
would be fatal to the transfer outside of bankruptcy-such as due on
sale mortgage provisions or even monetary or non-monetary de-
faults-can be effectively eliminated by the plan. Chapter 11 also of-
fers an opportunity for the debtor to obtain additional financing to
fund its operations or to make improvements to its project. Moreo-
ver, if the requirements of Section 364(d)-the financing must be oth-
erwise unobtainable and the mortgage lender's interest in the project
must receive "adequate protection"-are satisfied, the new financing
can even prime an existing mortgage lien.4 2
E. Avoidance of Pre-Filing Foreclosures
Any pre-bankruptcy transfers may be set aside in Chapter 11 as a
fraudulent conveyance if the property was sold for less than "a reason-
ably equivalent value" within two years of the bankruptcy filing.43
Foreclosures by mortgage lenders are, however, protected: If the
lender complies with all state-law foreclosure requirements, the price
received at a foreclosure sale will be deemed "reasonably equivalent
value."44
F. Detriments of Chapter 11
Although perilous for the mortgage lender, a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy is by no means an unmixed blessing for the borrower. Of
course, the borrower is given a stay of execution, but the reprieve is
not without its burdens.
proval of a sale outside of the ordinary course of business, the debtor generally must show that
the sale is supported by a "sound business purpose." See Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789
F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.),
722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). For the sale to be free and clear of any interests in the
property (including the liens of secured creditors), the debtor must then satisfy at least one
requirements of Section 363(f). Most cases have discussed whether a free and clear sale is per-
missible under Section 363(f)(3), which allows for such sales if "such interest is a lien and the
price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such
property." Compare Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25,
40-41 (BAP 9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Section 363(f)(3) requires that the sale price must ex-
ceed the "face value" of the secured liens) with In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 450-51 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1995) (holding that Section 363(f)(3) requires that the sale price must exceed the "secured
value" of the secured liens).
42. Id. § 364(d). The mortgage lender's lien can be primed by the new lender only if the
debtor is otherwise unable to obtain the new funds (which is invariably true) and the court finds
that adequate protection exists with respect to the mortgage lender's interest in the collateral.
The latter requirement is more nebulous. See, e.g., In re Strug-Division, LLC, 380 B.R. 505,
513-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
44. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994).
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1. Risk of Liability of Insiders
a. Risk of Liability on Insider's Springing Guaranties
The automatic stay does not enjoin creditor actions against third
parties, such as individual guarantors of the debtor's obligations. As
previously discussed, since the last real estate recession, many lenders
have required that a "deep pocket" borrower principal guarantee the
full repayment of the loan if, among other triggers, the borrower files
a bankruptcy petition. Although discretionary stays are sometimes
sought by management guarantors on the ground that warding off col-
lection suits diverts management from the reorganization effort, few
such stays are granted. 45 Insider springing guaranties are probably the
largest impediment to borrower bankruptcies.
b. General Partners
If the debtor is a general partnership, actions against general part-
ners, who are liable by operation of law for the debtor's debts, also are
not stayed. 46
c. Avoidable Pre-Petition Transfers
Transactions between the debtor and its controlling persons, both
before and after the filing, come under scrutiny. The creditors' com-
mittee or, if appointed, a trustee, may seek to recover payments made
to insiders as fraudulent transfers or preferences. 47
45. See, e.g., In re M.J.H. Leasing, 328 B.R. 363, 368-69 (D. Mass. 2005) (collecting cases).
The court has the authority under Section 105 to issue orders that are necessary and appropriate
to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105. A debtor can (in some
bankruptcy courts) obtain a discretionary stay protecting a third party guarantor if it can demon-
strate "unusual circumstances" that justify the injunction. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp.,
280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (establishing factor-based test for courts to use in determining
"unusual circumstances"); In re Calpine Corp., 365 B.R. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (affirming bank-
ruptcy court's section 105(a) injunction staying litigation between creditor and debtor's surety
bond guarantor because such litigation would require a significant time drain on a key debtor
employee whose technical knowledge was essential); In re PTI Holding Corp., 346 B.R. 820
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (enjoining civil action by creditor to collect debt from guarantors where
guarantors were, "in their own contradicted testimony," tantamount to being the debtor itself,
and such litigation would place a significant drain on the manager-guarantors' time and re-
sources). But see, e.g., In re Nat'l Staffing Servs., LLC, 338 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005)
("[A] garden-variety surety relationship" does not constitute the sort of "unusual circumstances"
sufficient to justify a section 105(a) injunction).
46. E.g., In re Hidden Pointe Properties, 343 B.R. 372, 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) ("As a
general proposition, the automatic stay does not protect general partners.").
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 547 & 548. Payments made by the debtor to creditors in the 90 days
prior to filing are subject to avoidance as preferential transfers. Id. § 547(b)(4). Debt service
payments made or mortgages granted during the 90-day period can be set aside as preferences.
However, payments made in the ordinary course of business within the meaning of Section
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2. Administrative Costs, Debtor-in-Possession's Duties
Administrative costs in Chapter 11 are heavy and must be paid in
cash on the effective date of the plan. Administrative costs include
fees of the debtor's lawyers, the lawyers for the unsecured creditors'
committee and other professionals, such as appraisers and account-
ants. Typically, real estate debtors turn to rents (both pre- and post-
petition) as a source to pay their expenses. Of course, from the mort-
gage lender's perspective, these rents are part of its security and
should not be available to pay administrative creditors without con-
sent. In addition, the BAPCPA added a new administrative claim for
goods sold to the debtor during the 20-day period before the petition
date.48
3. Risk of Loss of Control of Business
a. Glare of the Spotlight
The debtor's business is no longer only his or her business; it is open
to scrutiny by creditors, the U.S. Trustee and, of course, the court.
The debtor must file a list of all creditors with the Chapter 11 petition
and must also file (within 30 days or as otherwise ordered by the
court) a schedule of all assets and liabilities, a schedule of current in-
come and expenditures and a statement of affairs. Detailed periodic
reports of the debtor's operations listing all cash receipts and dis-
bursements must be filed with the court on a monthly basis. The
debtor must also submit to examination under oath by the U.S. Trus-
tee and creditors as to its operations, assets, transactions, proposed
plan, etc.49
b. Business Impeded
Management of the debtor will be occupied with preparation of the
debtor's schedules and other required papers. Although the debtor
continues to operate the business as "debtor-in-possession," virtually
every transaction outside of the ordinary course of business must be
approved by the court after notice to parties in interest.50
547(c)(2) are not preferential. Thus, regular debt service installments are generally not preferen-
tial. Moreover, all pre-filing payments made to a fully secured lender are immune from prefer-
ence attack since the lender received no more than it would have received if the debtor's estate
had been liquidated. In short, no harm, no foul. Id. § 547(b)(5).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9).
49. Id. §H 521, 1106; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004, which allows examination by any party in
interest of the liabilities and financial condition of a debtor if the court so orders.
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 364(b). In the context of determining whether a particular trans-
action is within the ordinary course of business, the Bankruptcy Code provides no definitional
2009] 13
14 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1
c. Appointment of Examiner or Trustee
Creditors may seek the appointment of an examiner or trustee. The
court may order the appointment of an examiner to investigate the
debtor's financial affairs if such appointment is in the best interests of
creditors or other parties in interest.5' The examiner does not take
control of the business. The court may also order the appointment of
a trustee to take control of the assets of the debtor on grounds such as
fraud or gross mismanagement by the debtor.52
d. Creditor Plans
During the first 120 days after the order for relief has been entered,
the debtor is the only party who may file a plan of reorganization.
After the debtor's exclusive period has elapsed, then any party in in-
terest, including any creditor, is free to file its own plan.5 3 The
debtor's exclusive period is often extended by the court on the
debtor's motion; however, it cannot be extended past 18 months.54
Creditor plans typically call for liquidation of the assets of the estate,
via sale or foreclosure.
4. Impact on Business
A Chapter 11 filing disrupts business relationships. Key employees
seek other employment, customers and prospective tenants become
wary about reliability, trade credit becomes scarce, competitors
guidance. Determining whether a particular transaction is within the ordinary course of business
is done on a case-by-case basis. While the extremes are easy to determine (e.g., a single asset
debtor leasing apartments certainly can decide whether to lease to a particular tenant at a certain
rate without court approval, while that same debtor could not decide unilaterally to cut rent on
every apartment by 75 percent in an effort to attract new tenants without court approval), the
more difficult cases are those transactions which are similar to what a debtor normally does but
different in some material respect. When in doubt, a party contemplating a transaction with a
debtor-in-possession should require court approval. Otherwise, the party risks an after-the-fact
determination that the transaction was not in the ordinary course and therefore unauthorized,
and not binding. See generally In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 796-97 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2007).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c). In a single asset case, it is unusual for a mortgage lender to seek the
appointment of an examiner. The preparation of the examiner's report results in both additional
delay and additional costs. The former is invariably detrimental to the mortgage lender's inter-
ests and the latter are often paid from the mortgage lender's collateral.
52. Id. § 1104(a). The appointment of a trustee in a single asset case usually results in a sale of
the real estate after some initial delay. Moreover, trustee's fees and expenses (including the
trustee's attorney's fees) will frequently be paid from the lender's security and a trustee may
investigate and pursue lender liability claims against the lender. For those reasons, appointment
of a trustee in a single asset case is usually not in the best interests of a mortgage lender.
53. Id. § 1121.
54. Id. § 1121(d).
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spread rumors and trade debtors hesitate to pay, among other
problems.
5. Difficulties for Attorneys Representing Debtors
To represent a Chapter 11 debtor, a law firm must not hold or re-
present any interest adverse to the bankruptcy estate and must be
"disinterested." 55 If the law firm has represented the debtor prior to
the bankruptcy case and is owed a significant amount of pre-petition
fees unrelated to bankruptcy work, the firm is regarded as a creditor
and is not disinterested. There also is the problem of compensation.
Pre-petition retainers are permitted, but the amount is subject to court
scrutiny and may be disgorged if found to be unreasonable.56 Lawyers
receiving retainers are generally required to obtain permission from
the court to apply the retainer. If no retainer or an inadequate re-
tainer is paid, the lawyers must seek court approval for payment of
fees as an administrative expense. Detailed time records must accom-
pany the applications. Generally, administrative expenses may not be
paid from a non-consenting mortgage lender's collateral, such as pro-
ceeds of accounts receivable or rents, so if the reorganization fails,
counsel may not be paid.57 As a practical matter, the size of the re-
tainer will be a useful indicator of the debtor's ability or willingness to
engage in the type of protracted litigation necessary to propose and
confirm a cram-down plan over a mortgage lender's objection.
IV. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Debtor
1. Building a War Chest
Prior to the filing, the debtor will have significant up-front costs,
notably payment of bankruptcy counsel's retainer. Creating a "war
chest" of unencumbered cash is one way to meet those needs, as well
as to improve the debtor's leverage in dealing with secured creditors
after the filing. In single asset cases, however, unencumbered cash
should be scarce, since the only source of cash (the rents on the
debtor's property) are generally cash collateral by virtue of an assign-
55. Id. § 327(a).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 329.
57. E.g., In re Blackwood Assocs., 153 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[K]nowledgable bank-
ruptcy attorneys must be aware that the priority ordinarily given to [counsel fees] may prove
illusive . . . ." (quotation omitted)); In re Cal. Webbing Indus., Inc., 370 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D.R.I.
2007).
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ment of rents in favor of the lender.58 But accumulated pre-petition
rents may be unencumbered, depending on state law. For example, if
state law requires that a mortgagee take an "affirmative" act in order
to "activate" its security interest in pre-petition rents, those rents may
be available to pay bankruptcy counsel.59
2. Deadline for Filing a Confirmation Plan
Although a single asset debtor does not have to file a confirmation
plan within the first 90 days after the bankruptcy filing, a debtor who
fails to do so must either begin paying debt service or else face fore-
closure of its property.
3. Search for Allies
The debtor cannot successfully reorganize without the consent of at
least one class of impaired creditors. A useful tool in persuading cred-
itors is a liquidation analysis showing that junior creditors will fare
better with the debtor's plan than with a straight liquidation (or fore-
closure). It is rarely difficult to make such a showing in a single asset
real estate. Natural allies for the debtor are unsecured creditors and
junior lien holders who would be wiped out by a foreclosure of the
first mortgage.
58. Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, debtors and mortgage lenders often fought
about whether lenders were required to take some affirmative act to perfect their security inter-
est in post-petition rents, with debtors arguing that post-petition rents were unencumbered and
could be used without providing adequate protection to the lender. The Bankruptcy Reform
Act, however, simplified the issue by providing that the lender's pre-petition security interest in
rents applies to post-petition rents to the extent provided for in the security agreement. See In re
De Cespedes, 241 B.R. 260, 262-63 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999). In other words, so long as the
assignment of rents or mortgage instrument is clear that the lender has a security interest in post-
petition rents, then the debtor cannot use those rents without the court's approval. Because,
however, courts routinely allow debtors to use cash-collateral to continue operations, arguments
now focus on whether post-petition rents are part of the debtors' estate or whether the lender
effectively took possession of the rents pre-petition. Compare Sovereign Bank v. Schwab, 414
F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that lender obtained constructive title to rents by sending a pre-
petition notice to the borrower's tenants) with In re 5877 Polar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 2001) (holding that assignment of rents was not absolute and that under terms of assign-
ment lender had to take possession of the property in order to deprive the debtor of title to the
rents).
59. Compare In re D'Anna, 177 B.R. 819, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that, because
Pennsylvania law required some "enforcement" of the mortgagee's right to receive rents, pre-
petition rents could be used to pay bankruptcy counsel's retainer) with In re 1560 Wilson Blvd
L.P., 206 B.R. 819, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (requiring law firm to disgorge retainer to the
extent it was paid from post-default, pre-petition rents).
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4. Sue the Lender
Debtors often resort to litigation or threats of litigation against a
lender to encourage it to agree to a reorganization plan. Asserting
lender liability claims and/or defenses in an action to determine the
validity, extent and priority of a mortgage lender's claim is a favorite
debtor tactic. Such litigation often provides leverage sufficient to
force a favorable settlement from a threatened mortgage lender. 60
5. Cramdown
Debtors often seek to obtain the mortgage lender's consent to a
debt restructure by threatening to confirm a cramdown plan over the
lender's objections. Cramdown plans can include features such as sig-
nificant term extensions, reduced interest rates, negative amortization,
balloon payments and principal writedowns, and sometimes, all of the
above. 61 A credible cramdown threat can create sufficient debtor lev-
erage to obtain a favorable consensual debt restructure.
B. Lender Strategies
1. Pre-filing Workout Considerations
a. Relationship with Borrower
The mortgage lender's legal strategy should be guided by its overall
business goals and objectives, not vice versa. To some degree, the
lender's actions will be guided by its relationship with the borrower,
including such factors as (1) the status and amount of other loans to
the borrower or its principals, (2) the borrower's managerial capabil-
ity, (3) its financial capacity, and (4) the integrity and credibility of the
borrower. This latter point is key. If the borrower cannot be trusted,
a workout is clearly not a viable option, regardless of the economics.
b. Collateral Evaluation
The lender should also evaluate its collateral position. What is the
current value of the project? Is there an equity cushion or is the pro-
ject underwater? A current appraisal will be necessary to answer
these questions. A physical inspection of the project should also be
conducted to determine whether deferred maintenance exists. The
60. For this reason, lenders often insist, with varying degrees of success, that a suit against the
lender trigger the borrower's principal's springing guaranty.
61. For two justly celebrated analyses of the key legal issues arising in connection with an
attempt to confirm a Chapter 11 plan over the objection of dissenting creditors. See Kenneth N.
Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know about Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979), and Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR L.J. 229 (1990).
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lender should also focus on control of rents and other cash collateral.
Depending on the jurisdiction, the lender may be able to take posses-
sion of the rents and avoid their inclusion in the bankruptcy estate,
but doing so may require the appointment of a receiver or other equi-
table relief.
c. Risk/Reward Analysis
Possible workout scenarios should be evaluated in light of both the
odds for success and the consequences of failure. If additional collat-
eral and/or personal guaranties can be obtained, the lender may con-
clude that its realization prospects will be enhanced even if the
workout ultimately fails. Even absent an additional investment by the
borrower, lender concessions such as a debt service reduction or even
a moratorium may be appropriate in circumstances where the pros-
pects for ultimate success are good and the lender receives an equity
participation or other upside consideration, but only if the workout
structure provides adequate safeguards to ensure that the lender's po-
sition (and its collateral) will not be further eroded.
d. Evaluation of Legal Position
A mortgage lender dealing with a financially troubled debtor should
make an early evaluation (before the automatic stay closes its ability
to fix mistakes) of its secured position by reviewing its documentation
and verifying perfection. Any defects in loan documentation should
be corrected. Liens unperfected at the time of the Chapter 11 filing
are voidable, leaving the creditor with an unsecured claim.
e. Forbearance and Workout Agreements
Before engaging in substantive negotiations with a defaulting bor-
rower, the lender should require the borrower to execute a forbear-
ance agreement, acknowledging the borrower's default and waiving
the bankruptcy stay. Likewise, any workout agreement with the bor-
rower should be made with the assumption that the borrower will sub-
sequently default and seek bankruptcy protection. Pre-filing waivers
of the automatic stay (or agreements not to contest a motion to lift the
stay) in a workout context have been upheld by some courts, and,
even if unenforceable, may help show bad faith if a Chapter 11 peti-
tion is filed. 6 2 Admissions as to default, collateral value, lack of de-
fenses, offsets, etc., can also be useful.
62. Although some courts find such agreements per se unenforceable, see, e.g., In re Pease,
185 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996), most courts instead scrutinize the circumstances in which
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A lender agreeing to loan concessions as part of a workout will ob-
viously expect something from the borrower in return.63 If the bor-
rower's principals did not execute a bankruptcy-triggered guaranty as
part of the original loan documentation, now is the time to obtain a
guaranty that terminates only in the event of a foreclosure not pre-
ceded by an intervening bankruptcy or other defensive efforts. The
lender may also benefit from additional collateral. Letters of credit, if
obtainable, are particularly valuable as additional collateral because
they can be drawn without violation of the automatic stay since their
proceeds are not the property of the debtor's estate.64
Additional collateral given within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing is
a voidable preference, unless the lender gives contemporaneous new
pre-filing waivers of the bankruptcy stay were given. Waivers are generally not given effect if
included in the initial loan documents. The closer the waiver to the bankruptcy filing, the more
likely it is to be enforced, particularly if the debtor was sophisticated and represented by bank-
ruptcy counsel. See In re Bryan Road LLC, 382 B.R. 844, 848-49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re
Desai, 282 B.R. 527, 531-32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002); see also In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R.
307, 310-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988); In re Orange Park South P'ship, 79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
63. If the mortgage lender agrees to a workout, it should consider implementing the workout
terms via a consensual Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Pursuant to the plan, the mortgage
lender can sometimes obtain revised loan documents and a "drop-dead" provision in the plan
that allows immediate foreclosure if the debtor defaults under the plan. (Some judges, however,
will not enter such "drop-dead" orders. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (giving courts discretion to con-
dition the automatic stay)). Moreover, if the debtor ultimately defaults under the Chapter 11
plan and attempts to file another bankruptcy, the second case may be subject to dismissal unless
the debtor can show that unanticipated changed circumstances caused the second filing. E.g., In
re 1633 Broadway Mars Restaurant Corp., 388 B.R. 490, 500 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (to protect
"the integrity of the reorganization process," courts will generally require "a showing of unantic-
ipated changes in circumstances that were not foreseeable at the time the first [reorganization]
plan was confirmed" in order to stave off dismissal). A change in market conditions alone will
not satisfy the changed circumstances requirement. E.g., In re Motel Props., 314 B.R. 889, 896
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) ("Debtor did not present evidence that the decline in the economy was
anything more than the general market fluctuations in an industry dependent upon the discre-
tionary spending of its consumer base.").
64. Although the law is clear that drawing on a letter of credit does not a violate the auto-
matic stay (on the theory that a letter of credit is a contract between the issuer bank and the
beneficiary, and does not directly involve the debtor's estate), see, e.g., In re Air Conditioning,
Inc., 845 F.2d 293, 296 (11th Cir. 1988), courts have been known to interfere with letters of credit
issued during the 11 U.S.C. § 547 preference period on the theory that, unlike the letter of credit
itself, "[c]ollateral which has been pledged as security for a letter of credit ... is property of the
debtor's estate." Id. (emphasis in original); see also In re Kaiser Group Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 558,
566-67 (3d Cir. 2005) (collecting cases). Creditors in workout negotiations should be careful to
obtain the collateral securing the letter of credit from someone other than the potential bank-
ruptcy debtor to avert this possibility. Cf., e.g., In re Air Conditioning, 845 F.2d at 297-98
("There are several possible sources from which the [collateral for the letter of credit] could have
come such that the transfer to the bank would not have created a preference."). Further, letter
of credit provisions must be carefully drafted so that declaring a default or another act forbidden
by the automatic stay is not a condition to drawing on the letter of credit. See In re Student Fin.
Corp., 378 B.R. 73, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
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value. But preference fears should not prevent a lender from acquir-
ing additional collateral, if available. To be sure, the lender will lose
the new collateral if it is later found to be preferential, but the lender
will be no worse off than if it never got the new collateral in the first
place.
2. What Is a Secured Claim?
a. Definition
A claim of a creditor secured by a lien on the debtor's property or
that is subject to a right of setoff is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of the creditor's interest in the collateral, or to the extent of the
amount subject to setoff. To the extent that the value of the creditor's
interest or the amount subject to setoff is less than the amount of the
creditor's total claim, then the claim is unsecured.65 Even a mortgage
lender whose loan is non-recourse is generally deemed to have an un-
secured deficiency claim against the debtor in the amount of the
deficiency. 66
b. Components of a Secured Claim
If a secured claim is oversecured (meaning that the collateral's value
is greater than the debt), the secured creditor may receive post-peti-
tion interest on the claim and any reasonable fees, costs or charges
provided for under the agreement on which the claim is based.67 Stat-
65. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Under Section 506(a), a mortgage lender potentially has two claims.
First, the mortgage lender has a secured claim to the extent of the value of the collateral securing
the claim. The creditor also has an unsecured claim in the amount of any deficiency. Because of
the effect of Section 506(a), valuation of the real estate, invariably determined via a battle of
appraisers, is a key issue in every Chapter 11 single asset case. Valuation for purposes of Section
506(a) is as of the petition date. Conversely, valuation in the context of confirmation of a plan of
reorganization is determined as of the confirmation date. In a protracted case, confirmation may
be two or three years from filing and project values can change if market conditions change.
66. Id. § 1111(b).
67. Id. § 506(b). There are several requirements that a mortgage lender must satisfy in order
to recover its attorneys' fees and costs. First, the lender must demonstrate that the loan docu-
ments allow attorneys' fees and costs to be collected. Second, the lender must file a fee applica-
tion. The fee application requires a rigorous and detailed showing of the time involved,
including such requirements as separate entries for each service performed. Third, the court
must find that the fees are reasonable. At least one court has held that a lender with a first
priority lien that has been "wrapped" by a wrap-around mortgage is not in privity of contract
with a debtor and, for that reason, has no direct claim against the debtor for fees under Section
506(b). See In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 794 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989). But see In re East Ridge
Assocs., 122 B.R. 809 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (noting that "[t]he purpose of the privity requirement ...
is to prevent an unwitting stranger to an agreement from being stuck with an obligation [for
attorneys' fees] for which he or she did not bargain," and distinguishing Club Associates on the
ground that the instant debtor was an entity closely-related to the original debtor and controlled
by the same parties that controlled the original debtor).
[Vol. 8:1
SINGLE ASSET BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS
utory attorneys' fees based on a percentage of the debt are generally
not allowed, but actual, reasonable attorneys' fees generally are
allowed. 68
c. Section 1111(b) Election
An undersecured lender can elect to have the full amount of its
claim deemed secured, regardless of the value of its collateral. This
election eliminates the lender's unsecured deficiency claim. The elect-
ing lender retains its lien on the project in the full amount of its claim
and must receive under the plan cash payments equal to the full
amount of its claim; however, the stream of payments need only have
a present value equal to the value of its collateral. In effect, the lender
retains its principal in full without diminution, but receives interest at
a rate sufficiently below market to make the discounted value of the
payment stream equal to the value of its collateral. Section 1111(b)
was enacted to eviscerate the holding in a notorious case decided
under the former Bankruptcy Act6 9 in which the borrower crammed
down two undersecured non-recourse mortgages by cashing out the
value of their collateral and retaining ownership of the project, leaving
the lenders no opportunity to realize the benefits of any subsequent
appreciation or to recover their deficiencies. The Section 1111(b)
election can be of benefit to an undersecured lender in a situation
where it expects the value of the collateral to increase rapidly (or
where the lender believes the bankruptcy court has seriously under-
valued its security) and the plan calls for a short-term payout and con-
tains a due-on-sale provision. The lender can make the election at any
time prior to the conclusion of the hearing on the disclosure statement
(i.e., after the lender knows how it will be treated under the plan). 70
68. See In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1314-16 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that all such
attorneys' fees must be judged for reasonableness under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)). Although most
courts seem to agree that the section 506(b) reasonableness standard applies to attorneys' fees if
the statute is triggered, there is some disagreement about when section 506(b) itself is triggered.
Compare, e.g., Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1316 (holding that the section 506(b) reasonableness analysis
applies regardless of whether the attorneys' fee claim vested pre-petition or post-petition) with
In re Leatherland Corp., 302 B.R. 250, 256-58 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that section
506(b) analysis only applies to claims that vest post-petition, not those that vest pre-petition) and
In re Vanderveer Estates Holdings, Inc., 283 B.R. 122, 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Interests,
fees, costs and charges arising pre-petition are part of the secured creditor's claim in the first
instance, and are therefore not governed by § 506(b)."). See generally In re Robb, No. 07-50429,
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1680, at *7-*8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio June 10, 2008) (unpublished) ("There is a
split of authority as to whether § 506(b) limits prepetition amounts.") (collecting cases).
69. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976).
70. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3014.
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d. Constitutional Protection
A secured creditor's interest in property of the estate (i.e., the lien)
is subject to constitutional protection and may not be discharged with-
out just compensation.71 In general, the holder of a secured claim has
the right to receive its collateral or to receive the value of its
collateral.
3. Cash Collateral
The debtor is generally prohibited from using cash collateral absent
court approval or the secured creditor's consent,72 but a mortgage
lender should not assume that the debtor will comply with this re-
quirement. As a practical matter, courts will rarely sanction debtors
severely for unauthorized use of cash collateral so long as the cash
collateral is used to pay costs incurred in maintaining and operating
the project. Consequently, upon filing of the Chapter 11 petition, a
mortgage lender should immediately move to prohibit or restrict the
debtor's use of rents and other cash collateral.
The court cannot authorize use of cash collateral unless it finds that
the debtor has provided the lender with "adequate protection" of its
interest in the cash collateral. However, almost all bankruptcy courts
will authorize a debtor to use rents to operate and maintain a real
estate project on the understandable rationale that rents applied to
the operation and maintenance of the project will maintain the value
of the primary collateral (i.e., the real estate). Thus, so the theory
goes, the lender's interest in the rents will receive "adequate protec-
tion" by use of the rents to maintain the real estate. Therefore, it is
unlikely that a lender will be successful in absolutely prohibiting the
debtor's use of the rents, but bankruptcy courts will typically require
budgetary limitations on expenditures, monthly reporting require-
ments, and the payment to the lender of the monthly net operating
income. Frequently, a debtor will consent to a cash collateral order
that, by its terms, provides that the debtor's failure to file or confirm a
plan by a specified deadline or the debtor's unauthorized expenditure
of cash collateral will automatically terminate the automatic stay (al-
though some bankruptcy judges are reluctant or unwilling to enter
such "drop dead" orders).
71. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982); In re Weinstein, 164 F.3d
677, 684-86 (1st Cir. 1999).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2006). Cash collateral is defined, in part, as any cash proceeds or
rents generated by property (including hotel lodging fees) subject to a security interest. Id.
§ 363(a).
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4. Relief from the Automatic Stay
a. Effect of Stay
As noted, the automatic stay enjoins foreclosures and enforcement
of any other remedies against the debtor or its property. In addition,
a secured creditor that has taken possession of its collateral, but has
not yet sold it or, if cash, applied it to the debt as of the time of filing,
may be required to turn over the collateral to the debtor.73 For this
reason, if a bankruptcy filing is thought to be imminent, a lender
should immediately pay down its debt with any cash collateral in its
possession, such as rents or escrow account proceeds, so that it will
not be available to the debtor in the event of a bankruptcy filing. The
lender should make sure that its records clearly reflect the payment.
Even if a mortgage lender has been able to obtain appointment of a
state court receiver in aid of foreclosure, 74 the receiver must turn over
possession of the property to the debtor upon the filing of a Chapter
11 petition.75 The bankruptcy court can order that the state court re-
ceiver remain in possession of the project if it finds it would be "in the
interests of creditors."7 6 This power is not often exercised, but it has
been employed in cases where pre-filing mismanagement or miscon-
duct is present.77
b. Basis for Relief
i. Cause, Including Lack of Adequate Protection
A mortgage lender may move for relief from the automatic stay to
permit it to exercise its remedies for "cause," which includes lack of
"adequate protection" for the lender's interest in collateral.78 The
73. Id. § 542(a); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983).
74. Bankruptcy courts have no authority to appoint receivers themselves; they can only excuse
the Bankruptcy Code's requirements and allow previously-appointed receivers to remain in
place. See In re Stratesec, Inc., 324 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) (2006).
76. Id. § 543(d)(1); see In re Falconridge, LLC, No. 07-bk-19200, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3755,
*17-*18 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2007).
77. Courts use a variety of factor-based tests to determine whether the turnover requirement
should be excused, given the particular facts of each case. Mismanagement is universally consid-
ered as a factor. See, e.g., In re R&G Properties, No. 08-10876, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3132, at
*24-*25 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 21, 2008); Falconridge, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3755, at *21-*22; In re
Dill, 163 B.R. 221, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). If the court allows a receiver to stay in place, the case
may be over as a practical matter. Without the ability to operate the property and pay manage-
ment fees to an affiliate, the debtor may quickly lose interest.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2006).
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bankruptcy code does not define "cause" or "adequate protection,"79
but it does provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of adequate pro-
tection, including periodic payments to the extent that the stay results
in a decrease in the value of the lender's interest in the collateral or
giving the lender an additional lien or replacement lien in the prop-
erty, again to the extent that the stay results in a decrease in the value
of the lender's interest in the collateral.80 Because adequate protec-
tion is intended to protect a creditor from a decrease in value of the
collateral, a lender is not entitled to adequate protection payments to
compensate it for lost opportunity costs.8
If there is an "equity cushion" the debtor can argue that the equity
provides adequate protection, even if the debtor is not making pay-
ments.82 Furthermore, if the lender is undersecured, a court may deny
relief from the stay so long as the debtor makes periodic payments
sufficient to protect the lender from a decrease in the value of the
collateral due to the stay (even if the payments are not in the full
amount specified in the note).83 Junior liens are not considered in
determining whether an equity cushion exists. 84
ii. The Debtor Has No Equity and the Property is
Not Necessary for Reorganization
A mortgage lender may also move for relief from the stay if the
debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary
for a successful reorganization.85 The debtor's lack of equity in the
property takes into account the amount of all secured claims against
the collateral, not just the secured claims of the party seeking relief
from the automatic stay. 86
79. See, e.g., In re Shaw Indus., 300 B.R. 861, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) ("Exactly what
constitutes adequate protection must be decided on a case by case basis." (quoting In re
O'Connor, 808 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (1987))).
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (2006).
81. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372-73.
82. See, e.g., In re Gallegos Research Group, Corp., 193 B.R. 577, 584-85 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1995). If the property qualifies as single asset real estate, however, the debtor either must begin
making interest payments at the non-default contract rate or file a plan with a reasonable likeli-
hood of being confirmed within a reasonable time. Otherwise the lender is entitled to relief
from the stay. See supra Section II.A.
83. See, e.g., Deep River Warehouse, Inc., 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1090, at *32.
84. In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1995).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2006).
86. Although similar sounding, whether an "equity cushion" exists is different from whether
the debtor has equity in the property. Because junior liens are not considered in calculating the
equity cushion, an equity cushion may exist even if the debtor has no equity. See, e.g., In re
King., 305 B.R. 152, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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The lender has the initial burden of proving that the debtor lacks
equity in the property. The burden then shifts to the debtor, who
must prove that the property is important to the reorganization and
that the planned reorganization is feasible.87 In a single asset case, the
collateral will, by definition, be necessary for the debtor's reorganiza-
tion. Accordingly, the key issue is whether reorganization is feasible.
The Supreme Court has articulated this burden as requiring the
debtor to show that there is an effective reorganization "in prospect"
and that there is "a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganiza-
tion within a reasonable time."88
iii. The Debtor Is a Single Asset Entity and Has Not, Within
Ninety Days of its Petition, Commenced Paying Interest on the
Creditor's Interest in the Collateral or Filed a Plan with a
Reasonable Likelihood of Confirmation.
As previously discussed in more detail, if the debtor is a single asset
entity, a mortgage lender can move for relief from the automatic stay
which must be granted unless, within the later of 90 days of the peti-
tion date or 30 days after the court has determined that the debtor is a
single asset real estate entity, the debtor either begins to pay the inter-
est at the non-default contract rate or files a plan with a reasonable
likelihood of being confirmed.8 9
5. Dismissal
a. Generally
The mortgage lender may seek dismissal of the case, although relief
from the stay is a more common remedy, particularly in a single asset
case where relief for the stay is tantamount to dismissal. The court
may dismiss a Chapter 11 case (or convert it to a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion) "for cause," including, but not limited to, (1) continuing loss to
or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation, (2) inability to effectuate a plan, (3) unreasonable delay
by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors, and (4) failure to propose
a plan within any time limit fixed by the court.90
87. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (2006).
88. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 375-76 (citation omitted).
89. See supra Section II.A.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2006).
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b. Bad Faith Filing
The bad faith filing of a Chapter 11 case can constitute grounds for
dismissal. Where the debtor has few assets and creditors and the peti-
tion is filed on the eve of foreclosure with little hope of reorganiza-
tion, the court may dismiss the petition for lack of good faith.91 This
doctrine is particularly well developed in the Eleventh Circuit.92 The
risk of dismissal is greatest where the debtor is a newly created entity
which received all of its assets on the eve of bankruptcy (the so-called
"new debtor syndrome"), or where there has been a prior bankruptcy
involving the debtor. Sanctions against counsel may be imposed in
egregious cases.93
c. Best Interests of the Creditors and Debtor
The bankruptcy court may abstain from exercising Chapter 11 juris-
diction if the interests of the creditor and the debtor would be best
served by dismissal. 94 This occurs infrequently. An example of the
circumstances warranting abstention is the eleventh hour filing by a
debtor to attempt to thwart an out-of-court workout.95
d. Enforcement of Pre-Filing Workout Waivers and Stipulations
As previously discussed, depending on the circumstances, a lender
may obtain a dismissal based upon the express conditions of a pre-
filing forbearance or workout agreement.96
91. In re Gunnison Center Apartments, LP, 320 B.R. 391, 399 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005); id. at
400.
92. In re Dixie Broadcasting, Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1027 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853
(1989); In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1988). Factors that are
present in almost every single asset case have been cited as evidence of bad faith filings. These
factors include whether the dispute leading to the bankruptcy is essentially a two-party dispute
between the lender and borrower, the lack of significant amounts of unsecured debt, the fact that
the case was filed on the eve of foreclosure evidencing an intent to delay a lender's rights, and
the fact that the debtor has few, if any, employees. Many of these cases involved single asset
debtors whose only asset was a real estate project. Congress has since amended the bankruptcy
code in response to this situation. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
93. The Eleventh Circuit has flatly held that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not
supersede the Phoenix Picadilly bad faith analysis. See In re State Street Houses, Inc., 356 F.3d
1345, 1346 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) ("We therefore . . .hold that the guidelines set forth by
this court in In re Phoenix Picadilly ... have not been modified by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994."). Some other courts have already followed suit. See, e.g., In re Springs Hospitality,
Inc., No. 06-13331 HRT, at *11 (Bankr. D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2006) (finding that single asset real
estate case was filed in bad faith). Accordingly, in some cases a lender may not ever need to wait
until the time periods established by the Bankruptcy Code have elapsed to get its property.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2006).
95. See, e.g., In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
96. See supra Section IV.B.1.e.
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6. Liquidation Plan
As discussed below, after the debtor's exclusivity period expires,
any party (including the mortgage lender) may file a plan.9 7
7. Appointment of Examiner or Trustee
In a single asset real estate case it is rarely advisable for a mortgage
lender (or at least one with a first priority lien) to seek appointment of
an examiner or trustee. A mortgage lender could, typically, only do so
where the borrower is irrational and the property is valuable. An in-
vestigation by an examiner or trustee might uncover pre-petition
transfers to insiders which are recoverable by the estate. Such recov-
eries, however, usually benefit junior creditors, not first mortgagees.
Although, in an underwater project where the mortgage lender's defi-
ciency claim constitutes a substantial portion of the unsecured debt, a
mortgage lender may benefit significantly if pre-petition transactions
to insiders are disgorged. Nevertheless, it should always be kept in
mind that a trustee's central mission is to get the unsecured creditors
paid and he may seek to do so by pursuing preference, lender-liability,
or other real or imagined claims against a deep pocket lender. Moreo-
ver, a trustee, as a supposedly disinterested fiduciary, typically has
more credibility with the bankruptcy judge than the debtor and, there-
fore, can be a much more dangerous adversary. Regardless of any
potential threat of litigation, appointment of a trustee invariably de-
lays the lender's reclamation efforts because the court will afford the
trustee time to investigate the debtor's affairs and to ascertain pros-
pects of reorganization. In other words, the clock starts all over again.
The mortgage lender must weigh these risks against the potential ben-
efits which might accrue to it by virtue of recoveries from insiders or
the ouster of a dishonest debtor from control of the project.
V. TYPES OF PLANS
A. Cure and Reinstatement Plans
If the debtor is in a position to cure a default in a mortgage loan, it
may reinstate a previously accelerated mortgage without the creditor's
consent if it compensates the creditor for any damage suffered in reli-
ance on the acceleration.98 A simple cure and reinstatement plan may
be appropriate in cases where the debtor's problem is a temporary
97. See infra Section V.B.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(C) (2006). A mortgage lender's damages include not only unpaid
principal and interest that is owed, but also costs incurred by the lender, including attorneys'
fees, appraisal costs, and other expenses incurred in protecting or recovering its collateral.
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cash flow shortfall that created the default leading to the accelera-
tion.99 However, confirmation of the lender's plan requires locating
funds to pay administrative claims.
B. Liquidating Plans
If the debtor has not filed a plan within 120 days of the petition,
then the mortgage lender may propose a plan,100 which will typically
call for liquidating all of the debtor's assets. A liquidating plan ac-
complishes in Chapter 11 what usually occurs in Chapter 7. In a single
asset real estate case, the asset is simply sold through bidding or other
processes designed to obtain the fair market value of the property.
This type of plan can be confirmed where sufficient equity exists to
generate some payment to junior lien holders and/or unsecured credi-
tors. A mortgage lender is entitled to bid for the property in connec-
tion with any such sale and receive a credit for the amount of its
mortgage debt.10
C. Extension and Composition Plans
These plans typically extend the maturity of the loan and restruc-
ture its payment terms. Unsecured creditors (including undersecured
lenders) are often asked to accept partial payment of their claims in
full satisfaction thereof and/or to receive equity interests in the debtor
in lieu of full payment. Existing loan documentation can be altered to
change default terms and, in some circumstances, reduce interest
rates.
VI. KEY CONFIRMATION ISSUES
A. Best Interests of Creditors Test
To be confirmed by the court, a plan must provide for each holder
of a claim that has not accepted the plan to receive, through the plan,
at least the present value of what the claimant would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation.102 This is the so-called "best interests of credi-
tors" test and requires a valuation of what the creditors are to receive
99. See id. at § 1124(2)(B).
100. Id. § 1121(c).
101. Id. § 363(k).
102. Id. § 1129(a)(7). To determine what a creditor would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7,
the court conducts a liquidation analysis. When determining what the property in a single asset
case would bring in a hypothetical liquidation, the theoretical costs of sale must be deducted
prior to completing the liquidation analysis. Courts often assume that costs would be 2 or 3
percent of the value of the property.
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under the plan versus what they would receive if the property were
liquidated.
B. Feasibility
The plan must be "feasible," i.e., not likely to result in eventual liq-
uidation or the need for further reorganization. This determination,
which must be made by the court, is a question of fact and usually
requires, among other things, a valuation of the project and an analy-
sis of cash flow projections. 03
The feasibility question is frequently one of the most hotly con-
tested issues in any reorganization attempt. The debtor inevitably of-
fers testimony that an upturn in revenue is imminent and will generate
sufficient funds to pay all creditors. A lender can counter the impact
of rose-colored projections by relying on the project's operating his-
tory, which, absent a dramatic (and favorable) change in circum-
stances, provides the most reliable guide as to how a property is likely
to perform.104 As one court has said "[p]lans that involve 'pipe
dreams' or 'visionary schemes' are not confirmable."s0 5 Courts have
rejected plans where the debtor has, prior to filing its petition, accom-
plished little in the way of developing its property.106 In addition, sev-
eral courts have rejected plans providing for payouts of ten years or
more on the grounds that the projections are so inherently speculative
in the outer years as to violate the requirement that the plan be feasi-
ble.107 Courts have also rejected on feasibility grounds plans that pro-
vide for negative amortization of the mortgage lender's debt and
therefore increase the lender's exposure and risk.108
C. Good Faith
The plan must be filed in good faith and must not, for example,
unduly favor insiders at the expense of creditors.109 Often, in single
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006).
104. See In re Inv. Co. of the Southwest, Inc., 341 B.R. 298, 311 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2006) ("A
glaring discrepancy between the facts surrounding past performance and activity and predictions
for the future is strong evidence that a debtor's projections are flawed and the plan is not
feasible.")
105. In re D & G Invs. of W. Fla., Inc., 342 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
106. Id.
107. In re Mallard Pond Ltd., 217 B.R. 782, 790 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997); In re Edgewater
Motel, Inc., 85 B.R. 989, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Anderson Oaks Ltd. P'ship., 77
B.R. 108, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
108. E.g., In re D & F Constr., Inc., 865 F.2d 673, 675-76 (5th Cir. 1989); In re M & S Assocs.,
Ltd., 138 B.R. 845, 850-51 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); In re Apple Tree Partners, L.P., 131 B.R.
380, 394-95 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2006).
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asset cases, the debtor's insiders also control the entities that provide
management leasing and other services (on a fee basis, of course) to
the project. A plan that enriches insiders at the expense of creditors
may be proposed in bad faith.' t0 Therefore, in opposing such plans on
"bad faith" grounds, it may be useful to compare the benefits (and
risks) of the plan to creditors with those to be realized by the insiders
and their affiliates.
D. Plan Must Receive the Favorable Vote of at
Least One Impaired Class
In order to be confirmed, at least one non-insider class whose
claims or interests are impaired must vote in favor of the plan."' In
single asset cases, this requirement has often led to plans, proposed by
debtors, that separately classify a mortgage lender's unsecured defi-
ciency claim from the claims of unsecured trade creditors in order to
create an impaired class which will vote in favor of the plan. Another
technique has been to classify separately the claims of rejected execu-
tory contracts, such as landscaping and lawn maintenance contracts
and equipment lessors, whose claims are negligible in amount but who
can be induced to vote for the debtor's plan, thereby satisfying the
requirement that at least one impaired non-insider class vote for the
plan.112 Having created the separate class, the debtor must then make
sure that it is impaired. Courts are wary (or at least they say they are
wary) of attempts to gerrymander an impaired class for the purpose of
approving a plan.113 Virtually all bankruptcy courts pay lip service to
this principle, but many bend over backwards to find some legitimate
basis for the separate classification.114
Unfortunately for secured creditors, the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform
Act overturned In re New Valley, which held that a class that had been
paid in full, but was denied post-petition interest was not impaired.115
110. E.g., In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 110 B.R. 362, 375 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006). Acceptance of a plan by a creditor class requires an
affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the amount of creditor claims in the class and a majority
of the number of claim holders in the class. Acceptance by a class of equity interest holders
requires at least two-thirds of the amount of the interests held by the equity holders in the class.
Id. § 1126(c), (d).
112. For a particularly egregious court-sanctioned example of this technique, see Confedera-
tion Life Ins. Co. v. Beau Rivage, Ltd., 126 B.R. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1991); see also In re Club Assocs.,
107 B.R. 794 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
113. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 243 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Windsor on the
River Assocs., Ltd., 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993); see also In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881
F.2d 1346, 1353 (5th Cir. 1989).
114. See, e.g., In re Pattni Holdings, 151 B.R. 628 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
115. In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73, 79-80 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
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Courts subsequently addressing the issue have found that a class is
impaired, even if paid in full on the plan's effective date, so long as the
class does not receive post-petition interest.116 Accordingly, it may
not be difficult for a debtor to create a class of creditors who will vote
in favor of the plan.
E. Plan Must Not Unfairly Discriminate
The plan must not unfairly discriminate against classes of creditors.
Essentially, this means that, although under some circumstances cer-
tain types of unsecured debt may be classified separately, the plan
must not unfairly discriminate among the classes.117 For example, a
debtor should not be able to classify the unsecured portion of a mort-
gage lender's claim separately from the trade debt and then pay the
trade debt class a higher percentage of its claims than the mortgage
lender's deficiency claim without convincing reasoning."s
F. Absolute Priority Rule
1. The Rule
Under the absolute priority rule, codified by Section 1129(b)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, holders of equity in the debtor may not receive
or retain any interest in the project "on account of" their existing eq-
uity interests unless all dissenting classes of creditors are paid in full
under the plan.119 This does not require a cash payment at confirma-
tion, but the creditors must receive either cash or deferred payments
over time which have a "present value" equal to the full amount of
their claims.
116. In re Valley View Shopping Center, L.P., 260 B.R. 10, 27, 32-33 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001);
In re Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 239-40 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000); In re Seasons
Apartments, Ltd. P'ship, 215 B.R. 953, 959-60 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1997); In re Atlanta-Stewart
Partners, 193 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
117. See, e. g., Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 10 (D. Conn.
2006) ("A plan unfairly discriminates against a class if similar claims are treated differently with-
out a reasonable basis for the disparate treatment.").
118. See, e.g., In re National/Northway Ltd. P'ship, 279 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (exten-
sively reviewing the First Circuit caselaw on the classification of mortgagee deficiency claims and
rejecting plan which proposed to pay minor unsecured creditors 90% of their claims within 10
days of confirmation, while requiring the mortgagee to accept a new ten-year note at the U.S.
Treasury Bond rate plus 1.75%, amortized over a 25-year period with a balloon payment at the
end, and including a provision that could render the even the secured claim unsecured).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006).
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2. New Value Exception to the Rule
Invoking a doctrine articulated prior to the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.12 0 and its
progeny, some courts continue to recognize the so-called "new value"
exception to the absolute priority rule. This exception allows the
debtor to retain ownership of the project, despite its failure to pay
objecting creditors in full, in exchange for a contribution of "new
value" which is both substantial and necessary to the debtor's
reorganization. 12 1
The Supreme Court, in Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203
North LaSalle Street P'ship, declined to extinguish, once and for all,
the new value exception.122 The Court did, however, limit the scope
of the exception, holding that a bankruptcy court should not have con-
firmed a plan over the mortgage lender's objection, where the plan
gave the debtor's pre-bankruptcy equity holders the exclusive right to
contribute new capital in exchange for ownership interests in the reor-
ganized entity.123 The court held that absent a "market test" (such as
120. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006) (a plan is "fair and equitable" only if the allowed
value of each claim in an impaired, dissenting class is paid in full, or if "the holder of any claim
or interest that is junior to the claims of such [impaired, dissenting] class will not receive or
retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest in any property").
122. 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
123. Id. at 458. In LaSalle, the Court considered whether a single asset real estate debtor
could, over the objection of its impaired mortgage lender, confirm a reorganization plan that
afforded certain of the debtor's partners the exclusive opportunity to contribute $6.125 million in
new capital in exchange for ownership interests in the reorganized debtor. Id. at 437-40. Exten-
sively analyzing the case law and policy justifications for the purported new value exception, Id.
at 444-54, the Court ultimately held that, regardless of whether the new value exception in fact
exists under the Bankruptcy Code, a plan that allows old equity the exclusive right to contribute
new capital and thereby retain an equity interest in the reorganized debtor violates the absolute
priority rule and, therefore, cannot be confirmed over the objection of impaired creditors. Id. at
458 In so holding, LaSalle squarely rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in In re Bonner
Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), where the court expressly reaffirmed the existence of the
new value exception for a plan under which the equity holders would retain control of the debtor
(a real estate partnership whose sole asset was a shopping mall) by contributing $200,000 of new
value, while the sole mortgage lender's $6.6 million mortgage would be written down to $3.2
million (the fair market value of the shopping mall), Id. at 901-03, 905-06. The court held that
the absolute priority rule would not be violated because the equity interests would retain their
interests in the debtor in exchange for a "genuine and fair exchange of new capital," and not "on
account of" their existing ownership interests. Id. at 909, 917-18. Bonner expressly rejected the
conclusion reached by the Fourth Circuit in In re Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496 (4th
Cir. 1992), where that court held that where a plan gives old equity the exclusive right to own the
reorganized debtor in exchange for a new capital infusion, the equity holders necessarily retain
their interests "on account of" their status as existing owners. Id. at 504-05 LaSalle effectively
overruled Bonner Mill and adopted the approach in Bryson. Under the court's holding in
LaSalle it is now clear that even if the new value exception remains valid, it will not apply in
cases in which the existing equity holders are given "exclusive opportunities free from competi-
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an opportunity to offer competing plans or a right for outsiders to out
bid the insiders), decisions about whether a plan provided sufficient
new equity would be measured "by the Lord Chancellor's foot" and
that "an absolute priority rule so variable would not be much of an
absolute."124 Given the extensive analysis in LaSalle, many courts
continue to assume that this exception exists, 125 and these courts will
permit equity holders in bankruptcy debtors to utilize it-provided
that there are sufficient market safeguards in place to protect
creditors. 126
G. Negative Amortization
1. Cannot Violate "Fair and Equitable" Requirement
It has been widely held that the "fair and equitable" requirement
for confirmation prescribed by Section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code is not met merely by technical compliance with the absolute pri-
ority rule codified in that Code section. Rather, the courts have made
it clear that Section 1129(b)(2) merely establishes the minimum stan-
dards that plans must meet, and "[the] court must consider the entire
plan in the context of the rights of the creditors under state law and
the particular facts and circumstances when determining whether a
plan is 'fair and equitable.' 1 27 The Fifth Circuit held that a proposed
cram-down plan flunked the "fair and equitable" test, regardless of its
technical compliance with Section 1129(b), where the lender was a
short-term construction lender and the plan proposed to defer repay-
ment of substantially all principal for fifteen years, with negative
amortization over the first twelve years.128 These cases support the
proposition that, regardless of technical compliance with Code re-
tion and without benefit of market valuation." Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship., 526 U.S. 434, 458 (1999).; cf In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P..
138 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Where no other party seeks to file a plan or where the market
for the property is adequately tested, old equity may be able to demonstrate that it can meet the
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129."); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1010-12 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1991) (upholding a cram-down plan by which the equity holders were given a non-
exclusive right to acquire equity interests in the reorganized debtor in exchange for new capital).
124. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 450.
125. See, e.g., In re OCA, Inc., 357 B.R. 72, 89 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (noting continuing
debate about whether the new value exception exists and assuming, without deciding, that it
does).
126. See, e.g., Deep River Warehouse, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1090, at *38 n.11.
127. In re D & F Constr., Inc., 865 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 675-76; accord In re EFH Grove Tower Assocs., 105 B.R. 310 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1989); In re Spanish Lake Assocs., 92 B.R. 875, 878-79 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Edgewater
Motel, Inc., 85 B.R. 989, 998-99 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988). See generally Hon. Barry S. Schermer
& Keith W. Bartz, Negative Amortization and Plan Confirmation: Is it Fair and Equitable under
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1991).
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quirements, a plan is not "fair and equitable" if the risk of failure is
essentially borne by the mortgage lender while most of the benefits
accrue to insiders and their affiliates.
2. Not Impermissible Per Se
Most courts have refused to hold that negative amortization plans
are per se unfair and inequitable. For example, in Great W. Bank v.
Sierra Woods Group, the Ninth Circuit in rejecting the bankruptcy
court's ruling that negative amortization was per se impermissible,
noted with approval a ten-factor test articulated in In re Apple Tree
Partners, L.P., to be employed in determining whether a negative
amortization plan passes the "fair and equitable" test:129
1. Does the plan offer a market rate of interest and present value
of the deferred payments;
2. [Are] the amount and length of the proposed deferral
reasonable;
3. Is the ratio of debt to value satisfactory throughout the plan;
4. Are the debtor's financial projections reasonable and suffi-
ciently proven, or is the plan feasible;
5. What is the nature of the collateral, and is the value of the
collateral appreciating, depreciating, or stable;
6. Are the risks unduly shifted to the creditor;
7. Are the risks borne by one secured creditor or class of secured
creditors;
8. Does the plan preclude the secured creditor's foreclosure;
9. Did the original loan terms provide for negative amortization;
and
10. Are there adequate safeguards to protect the secured creditor
against plan failure[?] 30
Other courts use different analyses, but the ultimate inquiry is the
same-whether the plan unfairly shifts the risk of loss to the
creditor.131
H. Applicable Interest Rate
As noted, a secured creditor has a statutory (and constitutional)
right to receive the present value of its secured claim, i.e., its collat-
eral. Consequently, since most real estate Chapter 11 plans feature a
long-term payout of the mortgage, the two prominent factual issues at
129. 953 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. In re Apple Tree Partners, L.P., 131 B.R. 380, 398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991).
131. In re Windwood Heights, Inc., 385 B.R. 832, 839-41 (Bankr N.D. W. Va. 2008).
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most confirmation hearings are (1) the fair market value of the project
and (2) the appropriate interest rate to be paid the mortgage lender
over the lifetime of plan. Litigating these issues requires use of expert
testimony from appraisers and other professionals familiar with the
applicable real estate and lending markets.
The proper method of determining the appropriate interest rate re-
mains a matter of some dispute. A 2004 Supreme Court case, Till v.
SCS Credit Corp.,132 blessed the so-called "formula approach," in
which the court begins with a "risk-free" rate (the prime rate, for ex-
ample) and then adds interest to account for the various risk factors
that the court perceives.13 3 In Till, the Supreme Court purported to
reject all other methods of calculating the interest rate besides the
formula approach.1 34 However, because Till was a four-to-four deci-
sion, and because Justice Thomas's concurring opinion was not
squarely in line with either bloc's logic, Till did not settle the issue
definitively.13 5 Further, Till was a Chapter 13 case, and there remains
some question about whether its reasoning should apply to Chapter 11
cases. 136 Accordingly, courts could (in theory) still apply tests other
than the formula approach.'37
VII. CONCLUSION
The bottom-line bargain of a mortgage lender with a first priority
lien is really quite simple: either it gets its loan repaid or it gets the
collateral. This result necessarily follows from the lender's senior pri-
ority position: unless its mortgage is repaid in full, nobody else (in-
cluding the borrower) gets anything, because the lender's priority
132. 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
133. See, e.g., id. at 478-79; In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 442-47 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1991).
134. See Till, 541 U.S. at 477 ("These considerations lead us to reject the coerced loan, pre-
sumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches.").
135. See, e.g., In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 343 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("Due to the lack of
consensus on a legal rationale, the Till decision results in no binding precedent." (emphasis in
original)).
136. E.g., Thomas R. Fawkes & Steven M. Hartmann, Revisiting Till: Has a Consensus
Emerged in Chapter 1s?, 27-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (2008) ("In light of the fact that
relatively few courts have addressed in detail the applicability of Till in a chapter 11 cramdown
scenario, it would be overreaching to conclude that a 'consensus' has been reached on whether
Till should be applied in the chapter 11 context.").
137. See, e.g., In re Am. Homepatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to
"blindly adopt Till's endorsement of the formula approach for Chapter 13 cases in the Chapter
11 context" and instead creating a "nuanced approach" that looks first to whether there is an
efficient market for debtor financing before utilizing Till's formula approach as a last resort),
cert. denied sub nom. Nexbank, SSB v. Am. Homepatient, Inc., 547 U.S. 1019 (2006). Indeed,
courts in the Sixth Circuit have been particularly resistant to Till.
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interest in the project and its income is superior to that of the bor-
rower and all other creditors.
Even in a single asset bankruptcy this basic principle governs if
there is equity in the project, since the debtor cannot retain an interest
in the project unless the mortgage lender is paid in full. Of course,
there is no requirement that the mortgage lender be paid in cash at
confirmation, but the mortgage lender must receive the "present
value" of its claim, i.e., if the loan is paid over time, the plan must
provide for a market rate of interest. In other words, a fully secured
lender's loan may be modified by a Chapter 11 cramdown, but basi-
cally only as to term and interest rate. In such cases, the basic rule still
applies: either the lender ultimately gets paid in full, at a market rate
of interest-or it gets the collateral.
In a single asset case where the project is underwater, the rules can
change dramatically. Invocation of the judicially crafted exception to
the absolute priority rule, when combined with artificial classification
and/or artificial impairment techniques designed to gerrymander the
creation of the requisite one impaired credit class to vote for the
debtor's plan, can destroy the basic bargain between the mortgage
lender and the borrower. Under this scenario, the borrower invests
new "value" (typically as little as possible), retains ownership of the
project and writes off all or most of the amount by which the mort-
gage debt exceeds the project's value. In addition, the loan term can
be extended and the interest rate reduced (if current market rates are
less than the original loan rate).
All is not lost, however, for a lender to a single asset real estate
entity. While the game remains the same, the rules have changed
since the last major real estate recession. Springing, exploding, and
other non-recourse carve-out guaranties may prevent borrowers from
seeking bankruptcy protection in the first place. And, if a borrower
files a bankruptcy petition, it will only have ninety days to either file a
plan with a reasonable likelihood of being confirmed or begin to make
interest payments to the lender. Even so, Chapter 11 is still a danger-
ous place for a mortgage lender, where passivity can be fatal. To
avoid even more substantial losses (above the lost opportunity costs it
will never recover), a mortgage lender must understand all of the
weapons in its arsenal and be willing to use those weapons in an ag-
gressive campaign to protect its interests.
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